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PUBLIC CONCERN REVISITED: A NEW ROLE
FOR AN OLD DOCTRINE IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF DEFAMATION
ARLEN W. LANGVARDT*

Central to the disposition of most, if not all, defamation actions is an
appropriate handling of the clash between the defendant's freedoms of
2
speech and press' and the plaintiff's interest in protecting his reputation.
Since the Supreme Court's initial recognition that there are constitutional
implications inherent in defamation, the Court has struggled to define the
standards governing such a clash and has found it difficult to fashion a
cohesive approach and rationale palatable to all its members."
Describing what he considered judicial floundering in a sensitive constitutional area, Justice Black once observed that the Court had placed itself "in the same quagmire in the field of libel in which it is now helplessly
struggling in the field of obscenity." 5 The Court attempted to extricate itself from the defamation quagmire by fashioning a set of standards requiring varying burdens of proof, depending upon whether the plaintiff was a
public official, public figure, or private figure.6 Although disagreement continued over whether the court's focus on the status of an allegedly defamed
*
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B.A., Hastings College, 1976; J.D., University of Nebraska, 1981.
1. U.S. CONST. amends. I, and XIV. The first amendment reads as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
Although the first amendment's references to freedoms of speech and press literally prohibit
only the federal government from infringing upon such rights, the first amendment freedoms
long have been held to be protected from impairment by the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 342 (1974).
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra text accompanying
notes 16-22.
4. Witness the various opinions, including concurrences and dissents, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), and
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
5. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 16-42.
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party effected a proper accommodation of competing constitutional rights
and reputational interests, 7 and over whether the status rules were being
applied properly to given fact patterns,8 the public official, public figure,
and private figure rules appeared likely to lead to a reasonable degree of
predictability of results.9 A significant portion of the predictability evidently
intended by the adoption of such standards has been cut away, however, by
the decision of a fragmented Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss

Builders, Inc. 10 Ruling in the context of a private figure plaintiff's libel action, the Court injected (or reinjected") a "public concern"'" element into
what had been a status-oriented inquiry for purposes of determining the
plaintiff's burden of proof.1 s
This article will contain an analysis of the puzzling Dun & Bradstreet
decision and its ill-defined public concern doctrine, in light of the constitutional cases that preceded the decision and those that have followed it. Inconsistencies and flaws present in the Court's reasoning will be explored, as
will the possible and probable implications of the newly-mandated public
concern focus. The article will conclude with suggestions concerning directions the constitutional law of defamation should move in the wake of Dun
& Bradstreet.
THE

PRE-Dun & Bradstreet

SLATE OF CASES

Prior to 1964, the constitutional aspects of defamation had not received
judicial recognition. The traditional common law defamation rules involved
the imposition of liability without fault on the publisher of a defamatory
statement. 1' Damages were presumed to flow from the making of such a
statement.15 In the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"
the Supreme Court recognized that there are first amendment implications
in defamation actions involving public officials as plaintiffs.17 Acting to ensure the robust debate on public issues intended by the first amendment, 8
7. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
9. See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch. Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 268 (1976).
10. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
12. 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
14. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F.
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.27 (2d ed. 1986).
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 112; 1 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note
14, § 5.14.
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. Id. at 264-65.
18. Id. at 270.
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the Court held that public official plaintiffs in defamation actions cannot
prevail unless they prove "actual malice." 9 Actual malice was defined by
the Court as meaning that the defendant either knew the offending statement was false when he made it, or showed reckless disregard for its truth
20
or falsity.
In the view of the New York Times majority, "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate," 21 making it necessary to insulate from defamation liability the makers of some false statements about public officials (i.e.,
statements made without actual malice). Otherwise, there would be a significant danger of undue chilling of the first amendment rights of speakers.2 2 The same actual malice rule was soon extended to plaintiffs who are
public figures," largely on the rationale that public figures are not significantly different from public officials in terms of the public's keen
interest in
24
their activities or in terms of their role in "ordering society.
A further extension of the New York Times actual malice rules was
authorized by a plurality of the Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.2 5
In that case, which involved a private figure plaintiff as opposed to a public
official or public figure plaintiff,26 the plurality opinion indicated that even
private figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice in order to prevail, if the
defamatory falsehood pertained to the plaintiffs "involvement in an event
of public or general concern. 2 7 Appearing to employ the terms "public or
general concern" and "public or general interest" interchangeably, Justice
Brennan, writing for the three-member plurality, 8 observed that the underlying teaching of New York Times and its progeny was that the first
amendment's impact on defamation law hinges not so much on the plain19. Id. at 279-80. The Court has also required that actual malice be proved, not merely
by a preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52
(1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
20. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The "reckless disregard" aspect of the actual malice standard
was later explained as requiring "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of his statement before making the
statement. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
21. 376 U.S. at 271.
22. Id. at 272.
23. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring
in the result).
24. Id. Chief Justice Warren also stressed that public figures generally have ready access, as do public officials, to the mass media for the purpose of countering criticism or erroneous statements about their activities. Id.
25. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 52.
28. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in forming the
Rosenbloom plurality. 403 U.S. at 30.
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tiff's status as it does on whether the defendant's statements dealt with a
matter of public or general concern or interest."
The position taken by the three Justices who dissented in Rosenbloom 0 was largely vindicated three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc."1 Repudiating the public concern or public interest approach32 taken in
Rosenbloom, the Gertz majority 2 established, for private figure plaintiffs,
new fault requirements designed to accommodate the competing first
amendment and reputational interests.3 4 The Court held that "so long as
they do not impose liability without fault," the states could fashion their
own standards of liability in a defamation action brought by an private figure.3 5 In the wake of Gertz, most states have opted for a negligence requirement, although some have chosen a standard similar to Rosenbloom requiring proof of actual malice in cases involving a statement of public concern
or interest.3
Concerned about the possible chilling effect that ready availability of
presumed or punitive damages could have on speakers' first amendment
freedoms, the Gertz majority also ruled that the states could not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages unless the private figure plaintiff
went further than the basic fault requirement and proved the defendant's
7
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth (actual malice).3
29. Id. at 44.
30. Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart. Id. at 62, 78.
31. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Id. at 346.
33. The majority was composed of Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell (who
authored the majority opinion), and Rehnquist. Id. at 324-25.
34. 418 U.S. at 346-50. Although he would have preferred adhering to the position he
took in Rosenbloom, Justice Blackmun joined the Gertz majority and provided the fifth vote
for the positions taken in the majority opinion, because he believed that the Court had been
"sadly fractionated" in Rosenbloom and that a "definitive ruling" was essential in Gertz. Id.
at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 347. Such a rule was what Justices Harlan and Marshall had advocated in
their Rosenbloom dissents. 403 U.S. at 64 (Harlan J., dissenting); Id. at 86 (Marshall, J.
dissenting). The Gertz majority, though finding first amendment interests present in defamation actions involving private figure plaintiffs, reasoned that private figure plaintiffs should not
have to satisfy the rigorous actual malice test in order to prevail. 418 U.S. at 343. The Court
concluded that a lesser burden should be required of such plaintiffs, because they, unlike public officials and public figures, do not have ready access to communications channels in which
false statements can be counteracted. Therefore, private figures are "more vulnerable to injury,
and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater." Id. at 344. It was also
significant to the Court that private figures, unlike public officials and public figures, have not
"voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury," meaning that private figures are
more deserving of recovery in defamation actions than are public officials and public figures.
Id. at 345.
36. Note, Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade Since Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 51 BROOKLYN L. REV. 425, 426-28 (1985).
37. 418 U.S. at 349-50. Justice Harlan had proposed such a rule three years earlier in
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The private figure plaintiff who did not prove actual malice but proved the
presumably lesser fault requirement established by the forum state was re-

stricted, therefore, to compensation for "actual injury" 38 -

with actual in-

jury having to be proved by "competent evidence concerning the injury."3 9
Gertz clearly reaffirmed the New York Times actual malice rules " ° for
cases involving public officials or public figures as plaintiffs."1 In determining that the plaintiff in the case before it was a private figure rather than a
public figure, the Court referred to different classes of public figures: first,
the all-purpose public figure, meaning one who had achieved "pervasive

fame or notoriety" in society; and second (or second and third), the limitedpurpose public figure, meaning one who "voluntarily injects himself or is
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
42
figure for a limited range of issues."
Although there was a disagreement among the Justices in Gertz and
succeeding cases concerning whether the Gertz rules were sound and
whether the public figure tests discussed above had been applied properly to
the particular facts of the cases, 43 the ground rules concerning plaintiffs'
burdens of proof in defamation cases seemed relatively clear, as did the

standards for classifying plaintiffs. An unresolved issue that persisted, following Gertz, was whether the fault requirements enunciated in the series
of cases beginning with New York Times and ending with Gertz applied

only where the defendant was a member of the media or in all defamation
his Rosenbloom dissent. 403 U.S. at 73 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
38. 418 U.S. at 349. Although the Court declined to give a complete definition of "actual injury," it did state that such term "is not limited to out-of-pocket loss," and that such
term would encompass such injuries as "impairment of reputation in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350.
39. Id. at 350. There need not be evidence assigning a dollar value to the injury. Id. It
can be argued, credibly, that with the broad scope given in Gertz to what constitutes "actual
injury," see supra note 38, and with no requirement that the evidence indicate a dollar value
for injuries, juries effectively have the ability to "punish" libel and slander defendants by
means of large, supposedly "compensatory" damage awards in cases where the plaintiff does
not or cannot prove the actual malice necessary to support an award of punitive damages.
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 831-32
(1985).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
41. 418 U.S. at 342.
42. Id. at 351. The Court's reference to being "drawn into" a public controversy appeared to allow for involuntary public figures. Such langauge essentially has been ignored in
subsequent decisions of the Court, leaving one with the distinct impression that the so-called
involuntary public figure classification no longer has any viability. See Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, 457
(1976).
43. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J.,dissenting);
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 484 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cases, regardless of the defendant's media or nonmedia status." Lower
courts had split on such questions.4 5 It was expected that such issues would
be resolved in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., because
it appeared to be a central issue in the case. 6 As will be seen, the media nonmedia issue was addressed by the concurring and dissenting Justices,
but the resolution47 of the issue was not significant to the plurality's disposition of the case.
THE

Dun & Bradstreet

DECISION

Some discussion of the Dun & Bradstreet facts is essential to an understanding of the decision. As a credit reporting agency that provided paying
subscribers with financial and related information concerning businesses,
Dun & Bradstreet sent five subscribers a false written report stating that
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a construction contractor, had filed a voluntary
bankruptcy petition. Under the terms of the subscription agreement, the
subscribers were not to reveal the information to anyone else.48 When
Greenmoss learned of the report, it notified Dun & Bradstreet of the mistake. Dun & Bradstreet, after verifying the falsity of the report, sent the
same five subscribers a corrective notice which stated that a former employee of Greenmoss, not Greenmoss itself, had sought bankruptcy, and
that Greenmoss was still doing business as usual. Dun & Bradstreet, however, twice declined the request of Greenmoss to reveal the names of the
Greenmoss then
five subscribers who had been sent the erroneous report.
49
filed its defamation action in state court in Vermont.
The false report resulted from information provided to Dun & Bradstreet by its employee, a seventeen-year-old high school student who was
paid to review bankruptcy court filings.50 From the statement of facts given
in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion, it is apparent there was negligence on the part of Dun & Bradstreet." Whether there was negligence on
44. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2942 n.l
(1985).
45. Compare Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied 459 U.S.
883 (1982) (Gertz held not to apply in private figure's suit against nonmedia defendant);
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980) (same); and Rowe v. Metz,
195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978) (same); with Antwerp Diamond Exch. v. Better Business
Bureau, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d 733 (1981) (Gertz held to apply in action involving nonmedia
defendant); and Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (same).
46. Wiley & Frank, Complications for Libel Defense Increased by Greenmoss Ruling,
Nat'l. L. J., Oct. 7, 1985, at 32, col. 1. See infra text accompanying note 57.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
48. 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
49. Id. at 2941-42.
50. Id. at 2942.
51. Justice Powell observed in the plurality opinion that the employee had "inadver-
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the part of Dun & Bradstreet evidently was not seriously contested in the
litigation, with Dun & Bradstreet essentially conceding the point. 52 The
jury found for Greenmoss and awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages
- actually presumed damages, because Greenmoss apparently did not offer
evidence as to actual injury. 8 Further, the jury awarded punitive damages
of $300,000.11 The presumed and punitive damages were awarded in light
of a jury instruction that did not require proof of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth (actual malice) as a prerequisite to the recovery of such damages.5"
Dun & Bradstreet's motion for a new trial was granted by the trial
court, in large part because of concern about whether such instruction was
proper under Gertz.50 The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the decision to
grant a new trial. That court drew a media-nonmedia distinction, holding
that the Gertz requirements did not apply in cases involving nonmedia
57
defendants.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court's decision, but for reasons different from those relied on below.58 Justice Powell
wrote the plurality opinion and was joined in such opinion by Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor.5 9 A majority was created by Chief Justice Burger's and Justice White's concurrences in the judgment.60 Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. 6'
Although the plurality simply ignored the media-nonmedia issue, expressing no opinion on it, the presence of such issue in the case generated
comments from the other Justices. Such comments make it clear that of the
nine Justices, at least a simple majority rejects the notion that the application of the defamation rules required under the first amendment should
tently attributed" to Greenmoss a bankruptcy petition filed by someone else. Id. He also noted
that even though Dun & Bradstreet's usual practice was to check the accuracy of such reports
with the businesses allegedly involved, it did not do so in this instance. Id. In his dissent,
Justice Brennan noted that the parties were not questioning "the requirement of Gertz that
respondent must show fault to obtain a judgment and actual damages." Id. at 2957 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
52. Wiley & Frank, supra note 46, at 32.
53. 105 S. Ct. at 2942; id. at 2965 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 2942.
55. Id. at 2943.
56. Id. at 2942.
57. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 143 Vt. 66, 75, 461 A.2d 414,
418 (1983).
58. 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
59. Id. at 2941.
60. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
61. Id. at 2954 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
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hinge on the defendant's being part of the media.62 One can make
ble argument that even though the Dun & Bradstreet plurality did
with the media-nonmedia issue, the various opinions filed by the
collectively should have the practical effect of resolving the

a credinot deal
Justices
media-

nonmedia issue, albeit in an unofficial sense and in a backhanded fashion.6"
Nevertheless, advocates of a media-nonmedia distinction in defamation actions still have reasonable cause to maintain that such a distinction is
64
viable.
62. In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
emphasized that no such distinction should be drawn. Id. at 2957-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Such dissenters reasoned that first amendment protection does not depend on the identity of
the speaker, and that the first amendment does not call for speakers other than the press to
have lesser first amendment protection than that received by the press. Id. Justice Brennan
also noted that a media-nonmedia distinction would involve unworkable difficulties in classifying certain defendants. Id. at 2957. Justice White agreed with the four dissenters that no
media-nonmedia distinction should be drawn, because in his view, the first amendment gives
the organized press no special protection beyond what nonmedia speakers are given. Id. at
2953 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Therefore, at least five members of the Court
evidently believe that a media-nonmedia distinction has no legitimate role in the constitutional
law of defamation.
63. Indeed, Dun & Bradstreet was read that way in Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 777 F.2d
1403 (10th Cir. 1985). In that case, the court, disagreeing with an argument that the New
York Times actual malice rule would not apply in a public figure plaintiff's suit against a
nonmedia defendant, noted that in Dun & Bradstreet, at least five members of the Supreme
Court had rejected the notion of a media-nonmedia distinction in defamation cases. Id. at
1409, 1410. Similarly, in applying the constitutional fault requirements to a case involving a
nonmedia defendant, the Supreme Court of Virginia characterized Dun & Bradstreet as a
decision that "draws no distinction between media and non-media defendants." Great Costal
Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 852 (Va. 1985). Such court noted that Dun &
Bradstreet "makes clear that the question whether to apply the Gertz rule prohibiting presumed damages in the absence of New York Times malice depends not on the status of the
defendant, but rather upon the nature of the defamatory words." Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 77, 118. Justice Powell's argument about limited circulation, discussed therein,
may be a subtle variant of the media-nonmedia distinction. Wiley & Frank, supra note 46, at
33.
64. One finds clear signals, in a recent decision, that some members of the Court still
believe a media-nonmedia distinction is appropriate. In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986), Justice O'Connor's majority opinion held that where the media defendant's speech dealt with a matter of public concern, private figure plaintiffs in defamation actions must prove that the speech was false in order to recover damages from such
media defendant. Id. at 1559, 1564. Justice O'Connor strained to emphasize that the Court
was enunciating a rule in the context of a case involving a media defendant, id. at 1559, 1563,
1564, and that the case did not require the Court to decide what standards would apply in an
action involving a nonmedia defendant. Id. at 1565 n.4. The significance and meaning of Justice O'Connor's attempts to limit the Hepps holding in such a fashion is called into serious
question, however, when one considers the position taken by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.
They joined Justice O'Connor's opinion and provided the necessary swing votes for a fiveperson majority, but they also joined in a separate concurrence. In such concurrence, Justices
Brennan and Blackmun restated their view that no media-nonmedia distinction should be
drawn in defamation actions. Id. at 1565-66 (Brennan, J., concurring). The necessary implica-
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Choosing not to proceed down the media-nonmedia paths, Justice Powell, for the Dun & Bradstreet plurality, observed that the above-mentioned
jury instruction, in permitting an award of presumed and punitive damages
on a showing less than actual malice, would indeed run afoul of Gertz - if
Gertz were considered controlling. 5 He characterized Gertz as a decision
that placed restrictions on what a private figure plaintiff could recover for a
defamatory statement dealing with a matter of public concern. Noting the
Gertz requirement that such plaintiffs prove actual malice in order to recover presumed and/or punitive damages, Justice Powell phrased the issue
as "whether this rule of Gertz applies when the false and defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern."" Answering such question
in the negative, the plurality held that "permitting recovery of presumed
and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements
do not involve matters of public concern.""
Attempting to justify the thinking that Gertz, or at least the portion of
Gertz dealing with what must be proved in order to recover presumed and
punitive damages, required not only an inquiry as to the status of the plaintiff (i.e., public official, public figure, or private figure), but also an inquiry
as to the type of speech involved (i.e., public concern or private concern),
Justice Powell stressed that all of the Court's earlier defamation cases
which presented first amendment questions had involved matters of public
concern." Speech on such matters was said to be at the core of first amendment protection, whereas speech on matters of private concern was regarded, in Justice Powell's view, as of lesser first amendment significance."
It was therefore an easy task for the plurality to conclude that the state's
interest in compensating private figure plaintiffs for injury to their reputation of such concurrence is that Justices Brennan and Blackmun believe any rule stated in
Hepps should be applied to nonmedia defendants as well as to media defendants. Id. The four
Justices who dissented in Hepps did so on grounds unrelated to any media-nonmedia issue. Id.
at 1566-71. It therefore appears that unless certain Justices' positions on the media-nonmedia
question have changed since Dun & Bradstreet was decided, see supra note 62, there still is
not a majority favoring a media-nonmedia distinction - despite what Justice O'Connor appeared to be laying the groundwork for in Hepps. A definitive statement of the Court's position on the media-nonmedia question is apparently being left for another day and another set
of facts.
65. 105 S. Ct. at 2943.
66. Id. at 2941 (emphasis added). The reference to "this rule" must be seen as a narrow
reference to the Gertz rule on proving actual malice as a prerequisite to recovering presumed
and punitive damages, and not as a broad reference to Gertz in general. For a discussion of the
other rules set forth in Gertz, see supra text accompanying notes 33-36 and 38-39.
67. Id. at 2948.
68. Id. at 2944.
69. Id. at 2945, 2946. According to the plurality opinion, such a notion was consistent
with the Court's "long recogni[tion] that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance." Id. at 2945 (footnotes omitted).
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tion should outweigh the reduced first amendment importance of speech on
a matter of private concern. 0 The opposite result had been obtained in
Gertz, when the same state interest had been balanced against what Justice
Powell considered a much stronger first amendment interest in furthering
speech on matters of public concern."1 Because the scales tipped in favor of
the first amendment interest in Gertz but in favor of the state's interest in
protecting its citizens' reputations in cases involving matters of private concern, it was reasonable, in Justice Powell's thinking, to conclude that a private concern case would not require the Gertz rule on presumed and puni72
tive damages.
It then became necessary, in light of its characterization of Gertz, for
the plurality to determine whether the defamatory statements in Dun &
Bradstreet dealt with a matter of public concern or only private concern.
Rather than enunciating a specific test for what constitutes a matter of
public concern, Justice Powell turned to Connick v. Myers 7 3 a nondefamation case which dealt with an employment dispute,7 4 for the broad standard
that whether a matter of public concern is present must be determined by
the statement's "content, form and context . . . as revealed by the whole
record."17 8 He then summarily concluded that in view of such factors, Dun
& Bradstreet's statements about Greenmoss involved no public concern. 6
In fleeting references at the conclusion of the plurality opinion, Justice Powell made the following further observations concerning why Dun & Bradstreet's false and defamatory speech was not of public concern and therefore should receive no special first amendment protection: 1) it was "solely
in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience,"
and was "solely motivated by the desire for profit"; 2) it was circulated on a
confidential basis to a limited number of subscribers, meaning there was no
significant interest in the free flow of commercial information; and 3) it was
similar to advertising in that it was "hardy and unlikely to be deterred by
77
incidental state regulation."
In their concurrences in the judgment, Chief Justice Burger and Jus70. Id. at 2946.
71. 418 U.S. at 348-49.
72. 105 S. Ct. at 2945.
73. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
74. Connick v. Myers involved an assistant district attorney's unsuccessful claim that
her first amendment rights were violated when she was fired following her distribution of a
questionnaire concerning internal affairs at the district attorney's office. Id. at 148.
75. 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
76. Id. at 2947.
77. Id. Justice Powell emphasized, however, that he was not labeling credit reports as
commercial speech, but was discussing credit reports alongside advertising "only to show how
many of the same concerns that argue in favor of reduced constitutional protection [for commercial speech] apply here as well." Id., n.8.
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tice White agreed that if the Gertz rules must stand, they should be limited
to cases involving matters of public concern, and that only a private concern
was involved in Dun & Bradstreet.7 8 The substance of each concurrence in
the judgment was that Gertz was a poorly reasoned decision which should
be overruled 7 9 presumably to make way for a return to the common law
defamation rules in cases involving private figure plaintiffs. 80
The four dissenters chided the plurality for unduly restricting the applicability of Gertz and for "depart[ing] completely from the analytic
framework and result" of Gertz. 81 Noting that in Gertz, the Court had rejected the public concern approach taken in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,83 Justice Brennan and those joining his opinion found it impossible to
believe that the Gertz rules had been intended to require a distinction, in
defamation cases, between speech dealing with a public concern and speech
referring only to a private concern.83 The dissenters also noted that even if
the public concern vs. private concern distinction were a sound one, the
speech involved in the case would have to be considered of public concern,
because of the importance of information about economic matters 84 and because the announcement of a local business entity's bankruptcy would be of
great significance to person residing in the area where the entity was located.8 3 As for the plurality's reliance on an analogy to commercial speech,
Justice Brennan observed that even if the credit report involved in the case
at hand were to be considered the virtual equivalent of commercial speech,
it would be deserving of substantially greater first amendment protection
than what was granted by the plurality in its decision making presumed and
punitive damages much more readily available than had been the case.80
INCONSISTENCIES AND IRONIES IN THE NEW PUBLIC CONCERN APPROACH

The Surprising Focus on Pubic Concern
Justice Powell's injection (or reinjection) of the public concern element
into the defamation rules for private figure plaintiffs reflects various contradictions and inconsistencies that cannot readily be explained. Although Jus78. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2953-54 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
79. Id. In addition, the Chief Justice and Justice White suggested that the Court not
only dispense with Gertz, but also reassess whether to perpetuate the New York Times actual
malice rule. Id. at 2948, 2950.
80. Id. at 2952 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
81. Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
83. 105 S. Ct. at 2959 n.I I (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2960.
85. Id. at 2961.
86. Id. at 2962.
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tice Powell hastened to label the Gertz decision as one involving speech of
public concern and stretched to make the applicability of Gertz (or at least
its presumed and punitive damages rule) hinge on the public concern factor,
it is no small task to find such a distinction set forth in Gertz. A careful
examination of the majority opinion in Gertz - an opinion written, interestingly enough, by Justice Powell - does not reveal any clear expression
87
of intent that Gertz's applicability be confined to public concern cases.
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, who dissented in Dun & Bradstreet but
helped form the majority in Gertz,88 clearly did not believe Gertz rested on
any such intention.89 Neither did Justice White, whose dissatisfaction with
the Gertz rules 0 made him willing to accept a construction of Gertz that
rendered such decision inapplicable to the facts of Dun & Bradstreet.9
While doing so, however, Justice White candidly observed that he did not
believe Justice Powell really was following the Gertz approach - an approach Justice White had thought "was intended to reach cases that involve
any false statements of fact injurious to reputation, whether the statement
is made privately or publicly and whether or not it implicates a matter of
public importance."""
The thrust of Gertz cuts against Justice Powell's later attempts to give
the decision a limited meaning. The obvious focus in the decision was on
the status of the party about whom the allegedly defamatory statements
were made, not on the content or nature of the speech. 93 The Gertz majority fashioned a set of first amendment-based rules geared specifically to
whether the plaintiff was a public official, public figure, or private figure. 9'
If the Court really intended that some of such important constitutional
87. Commentators have not tended to read Gertz as being limited to cases involving
matters of public concern. See, e.g., Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1225 (1976) (noting that in Gertz, the Court demonstrated an
"announced reluctance" to take such matters as public concern into account along with the
status of the plaintiff, and enunciated an "announced preference for making the public or
private character of the defamed person dispositive"). See also Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA.
L. REv. 1349, 1414 (1975) (observing that none of the rules announced in Gertz had any
"public interest qualification" attached to them, and that the tenor of the majority opinion
"would seem to preclude attaching such a qualification to any of them"). See also Robertson,
supra note 9, at 236 (reading Gertz as plainly requiring that fault be proved by all private
figure plaintiffs, without regard for whether they were involved in matters of public or general
concern).
88. 418 U.S. at 324.
89. 105 S. Ct. at 2959 n. II (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
91. 105 S. Ct. at 2953-54 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
92. Id. at 2952-53.
93. See 418 U.S. at 346-52.
94. Id. at 342-43, 346-51.
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rules should apply only where the speech involved is of a certain content or
nature, it is reasonable to conclude that some statement to that effect would
have been made in the Gertz opinion. Instead, the Court's reasoning in
Gertz offers every indication that the rules developed in such case were
designed to avoid the kind of content determinations Dun & Bradstreet now
makes necessary.
It must be remembered that Gertz discarded the Rosenbloom "public
concern or public interest" rationale as unworkable.9 5 Ironically, it was Justice Powell who observed, in Gertz, that the Rosenbloom approach "would
occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or
public interest' and which do not." ' That was a task which, in the words of
Justice Powell, "[w]e doubt the wisdom of committing . . . to the conscience of judges." 9 Yet that is precisely the kind of task Dun & Bradstreet, with its public concern approach, now commits to the "consciences"
of judges. If, at the time Gertz was decided, there were dangers inherent in
turning lower court judges loose to made ad hoc determinations regarding
the public concern or interest question, it is difficult to see how the dangers
are any less significant today or how Gertz credibly can be characterized as
a decision hinging, at least in part, on a public concern determination.
What has been accomplished by the Dun & Bradstreet plurality is a
revitalization of the once discredited Rosenbloom public concern doctrine
- with a twist. As in Rosenbloom, courts must make determinations, at
least in cases involving private figure plaintiffs, about whether the allegedly
defamatory statements involved matters of public concern. The twist, of
course, is that if a public concern is found, the actual malice requirement of
Rosenbloom is not applied with regard to the defendant's liability. Instead,
it is applied only as to the presumed and punitive damages question." Regardless, however, of whether the actual malice determination pertains to
the liability issue or the presumed and punitive damages issue, Dun &
Bradstreet has embroiled courts in making the very kinds of content discriminations the approach taken in Gertz seemed designed to eliminate.
Further inconsistency appears in the Dun & Bradstreet plurality's attempt to employ the balancing approach utilized in Gertz." In doing so, the
plurality weighed the state's interest in compensating private individuals for
injury to reputation against the first amendment interests of the speaker,
and found the state interest to be controlling over the reduced first amend95. Id. at 346.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 105 S. Ct. at 2948.
99. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 347, 348.
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ment interest in protecting speech on matters of private concern.100 Justice
Powell paid only lip service to Gertz in employing the balancing approach,
however, because he disregarded the Gertz statement that punitive damages
"are wholly irrelevant to the state interest" 10 1 mentioned above, which state
interest was the same in both Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet. 2 As Justice
Brennan noted in his dissent, "[w]hat was 'irrelevant' in Gertz must still be
irrelevant,"10 3 meaning that even if speech on matters of private concern is
of reduced first amendment importance, such a lessened first amendment
interest still should be sufficient to outweigh the state's desire to award the
"wholly irrelevant" punitive damages. Therefore, if Justice Powell's balancing act in Dun & Bradstreet really had been performed in a fashion consistent with the directives of Gertz, the Court would have had to conclude that
Gertz did apply, at least insofar as it made punitive damages, as opposed to
damages for actual injury, quite difficult to collect.
Similarly, the Dun & Bradstreet decision is inconsistent with other aspects of Gertz that the plurality did not address adequately. In Gertz, the
Court expressed considerable concern about the "largely uncontrolled discretion" of juries in awarding presumed damages where no proof of actual
injury was offered, and about the danger of juries misusing presumed damages to punish unpopular opinion through a large money judgment, instead
of to compensate plaintiffs for their injury.10 The Gertz Court concluded
that "the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such
as this petitioner [a private figure plaintiff] awards of money damages far
in excess of any actual injury."10 5 Born as a result of such concerns was the
Gertz rule requiring proof of actual malice as a prerequisite to the recovery
of presumed or punitive damages. 10 The concerns expressed in Gertz are of
equal validity regardless of whether the speech involved dealt with a public
concern or merely a private concern. Expansive discretion on the part of the
jury in awarding damages unrelated to actual injury is an ominous prospect
present in the private concern case, as well as in the so-called public concern case. Moreover, even in a private concern case, it is difficult to see how
the state could have any interest, let alone a substantial one, in granting the
private figure plaintiff "gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess
of any actual injury." 1 0 7 Yet the Powell analysis, in Dun & Bradstreet,
would countenance such awards by making presumed damages much more
readily available, in private concern cases, than they had been thought to be
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

105 S. Ct. at 2945, 2946.
418 U.S. at 350.
105 S. Ct. at 2945.
Id. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
418 U.S. at 349.
Id.
Id. at 349, 350.
Id. at 349.
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after Gertz.
The SurprisingAbsence of a Public Concern in Dun & Bradstreet
Equally hard to square with the Court's previous decisions is Justice
Powell's suggestion that the credit report issued by Dun & Bradstreet was
not of public concern and did not merit special first amendment protection
because it was speech about economic matters in the interest of the speaker

and its business audience.10 8 In other contexts, the Court has held that

speech dealing with economic matters is entitled to full first amendment
protection.109 This is true even if the speech is motivated by a desire to
make a profit.110 Although commercial speech merits less than full, but nevertheless substantial, first amendment protection,"' speech about economic
matters per se does not constitute commercial speech, as that term has customarily been applied by the Court. Sometimes the Court has offered a
potentially broad definition of commercial speech (e.g., that commercial
speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience"),"12 but the fact remains that the Court has found commercial speech to be present only in cases involving advertisements, which,
by nature, propose a commercial transaction of some sort."13 Because credit
reports do not propose a commercial transaction, they apparently would not
be considered commercial speech. Such conclusion was agreed upon by the
108. 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
109. E.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, the Court
analyzed a statute that allowed an arrangement whereby certain government employees, who
were represented by a union but were not members of the union, could be charged a service fee
in an amount equal to the union dues. Id. at 211, 235-36. The Court held the statute unconstitutional, insofar as it permitted the use of the service fees for the advancement of political
positions the non-members did not choose to support. Id. at 232-36. In coming to its conclusion, the Court emphasized that "our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters - to take a nonexhaustive list
of labels - is not entitled to full First Amendment protection." Id. at 231 (footnotes omitted;
emphasis supplied). See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (dealing with constitutionality of statute allowing banning of movies); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 101-03 (1940) (dealing with labor dispute).
110. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
111. Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
112. E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980).
113. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (advertising of
contraceptives); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (advertising on
billboards); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(advertising of electricity); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (advertising by optometrists); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (advertising by pharmacists).
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Dun & Bradstreet dissenters"' 4 and the plurality, with Justice Powell being
careful to emphasize that he was only comparing the credit report at issue
to advertising, and was not labeling such credit report commercial
speech. 1 5
More important, however, than determining what label to place on
credit reports is the notion that regardless of whether credit reports are
entitled to full first amendment protection or are some kind of commercial
speech analogue meriting less than full first amendment protection, there is
a high degree of public interest in the kind of information contained
therein. Important economic decisions having potentially far-reaching consequences are based on such information. Indeed, the interest in such information may be greater, for some recipients, than the interest in the day's
pressing political issues." 6 It is therefore anomalous that the plurality cavalierly dismissed the credit
report in Dun & Bradstreet as being a matter of
7
mere private concern."

Justice Powell's apparent belief is that the limited circulation of the
credit report at issue'1 8 points to a conclusion that it did not involve a matter of public concern.' 19 Such belief does not find specific support in the
case law. Indeed, in a nondefamation context, the Court has held that one's
first amendment rights are not lost simply because he decides to publish
statements only to a limited audience instead of to the public generally.' 2 0
The same approach to first amendment protection should be taken in the
defamation context. The nearsightedness of Justice Powell's limited circulation argument was emphasized by Justice Brennan, who stated as follows:
Perhaps more importantly, Dun & Bradstreet doubtless provides
thousands of credit reports to thousands of subscribers who receive the information pursuant to the same strictures imposed on
the recipients in this case. As a systemic matter, therefore, today's decision diminishes the free flow of information because
Dun & Bradstreet will generally be made2 more reticent in providing information to all its subscribers.' '
114. 105 S. Ct. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2947 n.8.
116. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 763.
117. 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
118. See supra text accompanying note 48.
119. 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
120. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979). The
specific holding in Givhan was that a public employee does not lose first amendment protection
where the otherwise constitutionally protected speech (for which the public employee allegedly
was fired) was communicated privately to the employee's supervisor, rather than to the public
in general. Id.
121. 105 S. Ct. at 2965 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The plurality's focus on the extent of circulation is an exaltation of form
over substance.
Even if, for whatever reason, the credit report merits some but not full
first amendment protection (a theory to which the plurality professes at
least some allegiance"), the ready availability of presumed and punitive
damages, as allowed in Dun & Bradstreet, does not give meaningful protection to even a first amendment interest of reduced importance. Allowance of
presumed and punitive damages on a showing less than actual malice endangers first amendment freedoms by cutting a swath broader than necessary to further the protection of reputation interest present in a defamation
action .1' The plurality's decision concerning presumed and punitive damages therefore violates the fundamental principle that "state remedies for
defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legit24
imate [reputational] interest involved.'
The Punitive Damages Problem
A final anomaly created by the Dun & Bradstreet decision is that with
the elimination of the burden of proving actual malice to recover punitive
damages in private concern cases, another part of defamation law has fallen
clearly out of step with the legal rules governing recovery of damages in
other tort cases. Defamation law's allowance of presumed damages, without
proof of actual injury, has always been something of an oddity. 12 5 Now, if
private figure plaintiffs in defamation cases involving matters of private
concern may recover punitive damages on only a showing of negligence, as
26
was the situation in Dun & Bradstreet,1
plaintiffs will be obtaining awards
of punitive damages on the basis of punitive damages rules which are considerably less stringent than those applied in tort law generally.
Ordinarily, a defendant in a tort action may be held liable for punitive
damages where his conduct was "outrageous, because of the defendant's
evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others."' 2' Such standard, designed to cover reprehensible behavior, clearly contemplates a degree of fault more serious than mere negligence."' The actual malice standard of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth much more
122. Id. at 2946.
123. See Ingber, supra note 39, at 830-32.
124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). See Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 565-66 (1980).
125. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. See Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52 and infra text accompanying notes 18999.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (2) (1979).
128. Id., comment b.
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closely resembles, than does negligence, the kind and degree of fault ordinarily required before an award of punitive damages may be obtained. Yet,
after Dun & Bradstreet, if a defendant negligently made a false and defamatory statement, of private concern, about a private figure, such defendant
could be assessed punitive damages, but if the same defendant instead negligently operated his motor vehicle and thereby injured the same plaintiff,
such defendant almost certainly would not be found to have shown the degree of culpability necessary to justify an award of punitive damages.' 29 It
becomes especially ironic that such results could be obtained in the respective cases just described, when one recognizes that the defamation action
would call into play an issue concerning the defendant's first amendment
interests and rights, but the automobile negligence case would not involve
any considerations of such significance.
Dun & Bradstreet's UNANSWERED

QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The most expedient way of dealing with the questions raised by Dun &
Bradstreet would be to pass off the decision as one peculiar to the erroneous
credit report context, and to confine the decision to its facts. 180 The language employed by the plurality does not permit the case to be read so
narrowly, however.
The Difficulty of Determining What Constitutes a Public Concern
Without question, Dun & Bradstreet mandates an inquiry not only into
the status of the plaintiff, but also into the subject matter of the allegedly
defamatory speech, 13 1 at least in the case of a private figure plaintiff."8 2 The
subject matter inquiry is necessary for the purpose of determining whether
the speech was of public concern - a now critical factor on which hinges
the applicability of, at a minimum, the Gertz rule on presumed and punitive
damages.1 83 The chief question left unanswered by Dun & Bradstreet is the
question of what constitutes a public concern, or, to be more specific, what
standards are to be used in determining whether speech in a particular defamation case dealt with a matter of public concern. Given the Gertz majority's disapproval of the ad hoc judicial determinations that would be necessary if Rosenbloom's public concern or interest theory were not
129.
130.
15, 1985
131.
132.
S. Ct. at
133.

See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
Sanford, High Court: Quirky Case Makes Murky Libel Law, Legal Times, July
at 13, col. 2.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-77.
The plurality opinion makes it apparent that Greenmoss was a private figure. 105
2941.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-77, and infra text accompanying notes 189-
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discarded, 4 the Dun & Bradstreet plurality exhibited a surprising willingness to have courts engage in case-by-case determinations of whether
speech touched upon a matter of public concern. 13 5 Yet the Court failed to
set forth any meaningful standard to guide the making of such
determinations.
Of course, the plurality did indicate that whether speech dealt with a
public concern is to be determined on the basis of its "content, form, and
context . . . as revealed by the whole record." 1 6 Such a purported test is in
reality no test at all. It amounts to little more than a message to judges and
attorneys that no standards are necessary because they will, or should,
know a public concern when they see it.1 3 7 The problems with such approach are that judges may not always know it when they see it, and that
different judges can be expected to have different views of what they see.
The Dun & Bradstreet decision can be likened to someone's directing
another party to search for the directing party's lost wallet, without giving
such other party a description of the wallet or its contents. Such other party
knows what kind of appearance a wallet generally has, and he may even
come back from his search with a wallet in hand, but whether he has the
correct wallet is another question. Similarly, a judge having to decide
whether a given statement dealt with a public concern probably has a general awareness of, or feel for, what he believes may constitute a public concern, but he does not have knowledge of how far the concept of public concern extends. Since different judges' respective general awarenesses of what
are public concerns cannot be expected to coincide in all particulars (or
even be very similar, for that matter) there is a significant danger that the
necessarily ad hoc determinations will lead to inconsistent results on the
now important public concern question.138 That danger, which prompted a
rejection of Rosenbloom by the Gertz majority, 3 9 does not bode well for
first amendment freedoms, because a court's erroneous determination that
134. 418 U.S. at 346. See also Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 761 (Powell, J., concurring) (comments to effect that judges should not be in
business of making judgments about sorts of speech that are more or less valuable, for first
amendment purposes).
135. Sanford, supra note 130, at 13.
136. 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
137. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (Justice
Stewart's much-noted "1 know it when I see it" discussion of "hard-core pornography").
138. Sanford, supra note 130, at 13. See lngber, supra note 39, at 839 (expressing dismay about any set of defamation rules requiring courts to determine the relative importance of
speech). See also Christie, Underlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification
of Defamation, 1981 DUKE L.J. 811, 820 (1981) (expressing similar point of view); Note,
Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 69 VA. L. REV. 931,
944-56 (1983) (discussing the difficulties courts have had in deciding what is a "public controversy," for purposes of applying defamation law regarding public figures).
139. 418 U.S. at 346.
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no public concern existed may lead to disastrous consequences for a negligent defendant, in terms of presumed and punitive damages. Besides
judges' inabilities to make consistent determinations on the public concern
question absent some ground rules or standards for making such decisions,
neither the makers of statements nor such parties' attorneys have any reliable way of predicting the extent of the legal difficulties and financial burdens they may encounter if their statements turn out to be false and a jury
finds them negligent. The uncertainty would seem likely to lead to a chilling
of first amendment rights.
Dun & Bradstreet appears destined to lead to determinations, both judicial and nonjudicial, about the relative importance of speech. Such a
trend in defamation jurisprudence is constitutionally suspect,14 and is capable of lending itself to such seemingly bizarre results as the imposition of
different constitutional rules on different speakers who are part of the same
media, or different constitutional rules depending upon which specific section of a publication contained the offending statement.'" Although such
scenarios are only possible and not probable, they point up the difficulties
inherent in Dun & Bradstreet's public concern approach.
Encountering the Semantic Maze
The decision about the meaning and scope of public concern is complicated by the semantic maze the Supreme Court has created in its defamation decisions over the past dozen years.' 4 The Court has spoken of "public
controversies," in the context of determining whether a plaintiff became a
public figure, for purposes of defamation law, by "thrust[ing himself] to the
forefront of particular public controversies.' 4 8 It appeared to use the terms
"public concern" and "public interest" interchangeably in Rosenbloom.'4
4
It used only the term "public concern" in Dun & Bradstreet.1
5
As used in the public figure context, public controversy also has an
unclear scope,' 46 but the Court has emphasized that such term contem47
plates something more than mere newsworthiness or general interest.
Therefore, public controversy and public interest must not be interchangeable terms. Presumably, public concern, as used in Dun & Bradstreet,means
something different from public controversy. If the two terms meant the
140. See Ingber, supra note 39, at 839.
141. Sanford, supra note 130, at 13; Wiley & Frank, supra note 46, at 33.
142. See Eaton, supra note 87, at 1423-25.
143. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
145. 105 S. Ct. at 2941, 2948.
146. Note, supra note 138, at 944.
147. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
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same thing, there would have been no reason for the Court to use a different term in Dun & Bradstreet. Just what constitutes the difference goes
unaddressed in the plurality opinion.
Justice Powell's insistence, in Dun & Bradstreet, on calling Rosenbloom's approach a "public interest" theory " and on ignoring Rosenbloom's clear use of "public interest" and "public concern" as if they
meant the same thing,' 4 9 suggests an ominous thought: that in the view of
the plurality, a matter of public concern somehow is different from a matter
of public interest, and the two therefore must be accorded different constitutional treatment. The futility of requiring subtle distinctions, for purposes
of the constitutional aspects of defamation law, among matters of public
controversy, public concern, and public interest,' 50 is exceeded only by the
absurdity of requiring such subtle distinctions without providing those who
must make the distinctions any intelligible basis on which to make them.
What the Cases Reveal About Public Concerns
Because of the lack of specificity, in Dun & Bradstreet, concerning
what constitutes a public concern, one must attempt to determine the
meaning and scope of the term by using whatever guidance may be found
in the Court's previous cases. It is not difficult to conclude that so-called
"political speech" would be included within any reasonable notion of what
is a public concern.' 0 ' It is to be hoped, however, that the boundaries of the
public concern doctrine would not be fixed so narrowly, because strictly political matters and other matters pertaining to the operation of government,
important as they are, do not constitute the only subjects on which members of the public focus their attention and concern."'0 Although one may
make a substantial argument to the effect that the public concern doctrine
"must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period,"'0 8 the Dun & Bradstreet plurality's determination that no public concern was involved in that case indicates that such an argument is unlikely
to win favor.
148. 105 S.Ct. at 2944.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
150.- Justice Powell's opinion also suggests a need for an inquiry as to the extent of
circulation of the defamatory statement. 105 S. Ct. at 2947. See supra text accompanying
notes 118-21.
151. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
152. See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
153. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310

U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
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Examination of the fact patterns and results in the Supreme Court's
pre-Dun & Bradstreet defamation cases may be of some use in determining
what constitutes a public concern, because the Dun & Bradstreet plurality
indicated that such cases generally involved matters of public concern.15 "
The clues given by such cases are not always reliable or easy to reconcile,
however, as will be seen.155 Such cases reveal that matters of public concern, for defamation purposes, are present in the following sorts of situations: a newspaper advertisement critical of government officials' interference with and handling of peaceful protests concerning racially
discriminatory practices in the South; 56 a magazine article alleging that a
prominent former college football coach had conspired to fix an important
game; 15 7 radio reports that a private individual was distributing obscene
literature; 58 and a magazine article alleging that an attorney was a convicted criminal and a Communist who had played a significant role in a
Communist plot to have an unmeritorious criminal charge brought against
a police officer.' 59
In its first post-Dun & Bradstreet defamation decision, Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,' 60 the Court found a public concern to be present where the purportedly defamatory statements linked the plaintiffs to
organized crime and alleged that the plaintiffs had used organized crime
connections to influence government operations.'" The Court labeled the
case as one involving a public concern, without elaborating on Dun & Bradstreet's public concern requirement or setting forth any standards for deter62
mining what constitutes a public concern .
With regard to what is not a public concern, one would be relatively
safe, for instance, in concluding that a report of even a highly publicized,
noteworthy divorce trial would not necessarily be considered a matter of
public concern. That was the situation in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 563 in
which the Court, incident to a finding that the plaintiff was not a public
154. 105 S. Ct. at 2944.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
156. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Although the Court paid
attention to the "public issues" question in Butts and its companion case, Associated Press v.
Walker, the Court's real focus was on the question whether public figures should bear an
added burden of proof in order to prevail in a defamation action. Id. at 134, 155; id. at 163-64
(Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
158. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
159. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
160. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
161. Id. at 1559, 1560, 1563.
162. Id. at 1559, 1563. For a statement of the actual holding of Hepps, see discussion
supra note 64.
163. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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figure, saw no public controversy present in the facts."" Firestone, which
was not cited in the Dun & Bradstreet plurality opinion, dealt with the
public controversy question as opposed to the public concern question,"'
but it is reasonable to conclude that the Dun & Bradstreet plurality would
regard the Firestone facts as presenting neither a public controversy nor a
public concern. That is because calling a report of a divorce a matter of
public concern would lend support to an argument that a report of a bankruptcy (as in Dun & Bradstreet) should be considered a matter of public
concern. Although it would seem logical to maintain that all reports of
court filings and judicial proceedings should be considered matters of public
concern, 6' Dun & Bradstreet and Firestone have shut the door on such a
broad argument. 6 '
The cases just discussed offer only limited guidance as to how public
concern problems are to be approached. Neither are the cases easy to reconcile. For instance, it is difficult to see how a report that a company declared bankruptcy does not involve a matter of public concern,168 but a report that a private individual sold obscene literature (as in Rosenbloom)
does deal with a matter of public concern.'6 9 Quite simply, the Supreme
Court, in enunciating the public concern doctrine in Dun & Bradstreet and
adhering to it in Hepps,17 0 has given lower courts very few specifics to rely
on when they make the public concern determination. 7 '
Because Dun & Bradstreet was decided rather recently, few lower
courts have yet had to decide how to apply the decisions. In Davis v.
.Ross,'"" the district court concluded that there was no public concern in
connection with allegedly false and defamatory statements made by singeractress Diana Ross about her former employee in a letter sent by Ross to
Id. at 454-55.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
166. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (invasion of privacy
action in which defendant held protected from liability for correct report of information contained in public records of criminal proceeding).
167. 105 S. Ct. at 2947; 424 U.S. at 454-55.
168. Dun & Bradstreet so held, 105 S. Ct. at 2947, at least where the company did
business only in a limited area or certain locality, as would seem to have been what Greenmoss
Builders did. See id. at 2941-42. A question left unanswered by the Dun & Bradstreet plurality is whether a subject of public concern would be present where the false report of a bankruptcy is about a business firm whose alleged bankruptcy, if it actually had occurred, would
164.

have had widespread effects on numerous parties invarious localities or across the country. See
Wiley & Frank, supra note 46, at 33.
169. For a similar argument, see Dun & Bradstreet v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905-06
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
170.

See supra text accompanying notes 160-62.

171.
172.

See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
107 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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third parties. 17 The same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of
7 4
Virginia in Great Costal Express, Inc. v. Ellington,1
which involved an
employer's false statement to the effect that an employee had attempted to
bribe a shop foreman in an effort to have unauthorized modifications made
to a company truck.175 In both Davis and Great Costal Express, the courts
made the private concern determination without any particular discussion
of the issue.
Matters of private concern expressly or impliedly were found to be present, again with little discussion of the issue, in post-Dun & Bradstreet decisions set in these factual contexts: a pediatrician's false statements to
school officials concerning the competence and employment record of a psychologist who had a contract with a school system to do testing on school
pupils;' 76 and a real estate investor's purported statements to the effect that

a savings and loan branch manager had sought "kickbacks" in return for
making financing arrangements for a partnership in which the investor was
a partner.1 77 No public concern existed, according to the Fourth Circuit, in
Mutafis v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 78 where an insurance company's intra-office memorandum described the plaintiff insured as having Mafia connections.' 7 9 Mutafis illustrates the difficulties lower courts can be expected
to encounter when they must determine whether a statement that ordinarily
would seem to deal with a matter of public concern 80 nevertheless becomes
a matter of mere private concern when one takes into account the Dun &
Bradstreet plurality's hints about an apparent need to consider the extent of
circulation of the defamatory statement. 8 '
173. Id. at 330.
174. 334 S.E.2d 846 (Va. 1985).
175. 334 S.E.2d at 848, 849, 851-52.
176. Saunders v. Van Pelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1124 n.2 (Me. 1985). Citing Dun & Bradstreet, the Saunders court noted that the defendant's statement did not involve "an issue of
public interest." Id. at 1124 n.2 (emphasis supplied). Presumably, the court meant to use the
term public concern rather than the public interest term it actually employed. Although the
misstatement was harmless in Saunders, one should remember what the Dun & Bradstreet
plurality's use of the public concern and public interest terms suggests: that the subjects to
which such terms properly are attached are neither coextensive nor entitled to the same constitutional treatment. See supra text accompanying notes 148-150. The specifics of the conceptual and constitutional differences between the two go unexplored in Dun & Bradstreet.
177. Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 535, 716 P.2d 842, 846 (1986).
178. 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1952 (1986).
179. Id. at 594-95.
180. Allegations connecting a party with organized crime are of the sort held to have
dealt with a matter of public concern. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct.
1558 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (invasion of privacy action in which Court noted that
matters having to do with crime "are without question events of legitimate concern to the
public").
181. 105 S. Ct. at 2947. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 118-21.
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Two lower court cases decided since Dun & Bradstreet involved fact
situations prompting conclusions that matters of public concern were present. In Machleder v. Diaz' 82 a "false light" invasion of privacy action
wherein the district court held that Dun & Bradstreet and Gertz were controlling with regard to a private figure plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, 8' the court implicitly concluded that the offending statements, contained in a television report regarding dumping of chemical wastes, dealt
with a subject of public concern. 84 The Third Circuit found that a matter
of public concern was present in McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 85 where the
plaintiff, a contractor, was referred to in the course of statements about a

notorious construction project concerning which a government official was
thought to have a conflict of interest. 186 In McDowell, which actually was a
public figure case, 87 the court appeared to assume that "public controversy" and "public concern" are interchangeable terms. 88 The court's
seeming confusion regarding the two terms was harmless in McDowell's
factual context'8 9 and understandable, given the Supreme Court's creation
of a semantic blur in its defamation decisions. 90 It must be remembered,
however, that the two terms cannot always be expected to lead to the same
result when applied to a given set of facts. 191
It should not be surprising that the courts making public concern-private concern determinations in the wake of Dun & Bradstreet have tended
182. 618 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd in part on other grounds and affid in
part, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986).
183. Id. at 1373, 1375.
184. Id. at 1369, 1373, 1375. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
entry of judgment for the plaintiff on the false light publicity claim, but did so on grounds
unrelated to whether Dun & Bradstreet's public concern approach applied. 801 F.2d at 57-58.
The Second Circuit never reached such issue, choosing instead to reverse the false light publicity judgment on the ground that here had been no false portrayal of the plaintiff. Id. Therefore, the appellate court had no occasion to deal with whether Dun & Bradstreet was applicable or with whether a subject of public concern was present under Machleder's facts.
185. 769 F.2d 942 (3d Cir. 1985).
186. Id. at 948.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The alleged conflict of interest that was the subject of the supposedly defamatory
statement had also been the subject of a legislative committee hearing approximately a week
before the alleged defamation took place. Id. This would indicate the presence of a "public
controversy," as that term was used in Gertz and Firestone. See supra text accompanying
notes 42, 143, 146-47. Because the real issue in McDowell was whether the plaintiff was a
limited purpose public figure, 769 F.2d at 948, some determination of whether there was a
public controversy was required. See supra text accompanying notes 143, 146-47. Any blurring, by the McDowell court, of "public controversy" and "public concern" therefore was
harmless, because there was a public controversy present under the facts.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 142-50.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 146-50.
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to do so in a summary fashion, with little or no analysis.'9 2 Dun & Bradstreet itself, with its abbreviated treatment of how public concern-private
concern issues are to be resolved and its failure to enunciate meaningful
standards for such determinations,'" has the effect of encouraging "kneejerk" resolutions of such issues. The likelihood of principled results is minimized by such a haphazard approach to the public concern-private concern
matter. Lower court decisions such as Mutafis'9 1 and McDowell' 95 offer
indications of the problems courts may face in deciding how to apply the
new public concern doctrine called for by Dun & Bradstreet. As more
courts have to decide their respective cases in light of Dun & Bradstreet,
the practical difficulties of applying such decision can be expected to be1 96
come apparent.
The Unclear Reach of the Public Concern Doctrine
Another major question left unanswered by Dun & Bradstreet is
whether the decision affects only the scope of the Gertz rule on obtaining
presumed and punitive damages, or whether the decision goes further and
eradicates, at least for private concern cases, Gertz's initial requirement
that a private figure plaintiff prove some degree of fault (at least negligence) in order to prevail.197 The only question actually involved in Dun &
Bradstreet was whether a private figure plaintiff in a defamation action
must prove actual malice in order to recover presumed and punitive damages, where the subject matter of the false and defamatory statement was
of only private concern.1 98 At the outset of the plurality opinion, Justice
Powell appeared to take care to limit the scope and effect of the decision to
that one question. 99
Nevertheless, some of the plurality opinion's language about the applicability of Gertz is phrased quite broadly, without being limited to the presumed and punitive damages aspect of Gertz.20 0 In view of such statements
192. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
194. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exchange,
see supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
195. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in McDowell v. Paiewonsky, see
supra text accompanying notes 185-91.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 132-41. Cf. Robertson, supra note 9, at 206
(discussing unworkable nature of the earlier public concern approach taken in Rosenbloom).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37. It is clear that Dun & Bradstreet's holding on presumed and punitive damages has swept away, from private figure-private concern
cases, the Gertz rule that a plaintiff who proves a degree of fault less severe than actual malice
must prove actual injury. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
198. 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2942-45, 2946 n.7.
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in the opinion, one could make a plausible argument that Dun & Bradstreet
has eliminated, for private figure-private concern cases, all of the fault requirements set out in Gertz, not just the presumed and punitive damages
rule. The argument would be grounded on the idea that if the Court, in
Gertz, was referring only to private figure-public concern cases when it set
forth the actual malice rule for recovery of presumed or punitive damages,
then it must have been referring only to the same sort of cases when it
enunciated the requirement that some fault, at least negligence, must be

shown in order for the plaintiff to recover. Justice White, in his concurrence
in the judgment, indicated his belief that Dun & Bradstreet does sweep that

broadly in its cutting back on Gertz,20 1 but his dissatisfaction with Gertz in
general20 2 may explain why he would be willing to embrace such an expansive view of Dun & Bradstreet's effect. Justice White may not be alone in
203
his reading of Dun & Bradstreet, however.
Although the kind of argument described in the preceding paragraph is
by no means baseless and would seem, in some respects, to follow from
what the plurality did say, it would not be wise to read Dun & Bradstreet
in such a broad fashion. 2 04 The effect of the decision should be limited to
the single issue presented by the facts, that being the issue concerning what
must be proved in order for the plaintiff to recover presumed and punitive
damages. Because the Dun & Bradstreet facts did not call for the Court to
201. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
202. Id. at 2950, 2952-53 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
203. In Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1952 (1986), the court spoke in very broad terms concerning Dun & Bradstreet and appeared to imply that none of the Gertz rules would apply in a private figure-private concern
case. Id. at 595. Whether the court really intended to mean what it implied is not certain,
however, because the court was speaking in response to an argument that the plaintiff should
have had to prove actual malice. Id. at 594. Therefore, the court may have intended to mean
only that the actual malice rule of Gertz would not apply, even though its remarks painted
with a broader brush. One commentator, in a brief mention of Dun & Bradstreet, appears to
assume that after such decision, principles of liability without fault would control a private
figure-private concern case. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the
Record Straight, 71 IowA L. REV. 226, 227 n.1 (1985).
204. It would seem Justice Powell could not have intended that Dun & Bradstreet sweep
so broadly as to eradicate all fault requirements from private figure-private concern cases. In
the Gertz majority opinion he authored, Justice Powell criticized Rosenbloom by stating that
under Rosenbloom's discredited approach of requiring actual malice to be proved as a precondition to the defendant's liability in all cases involving statements which were of public concern
or interest, "a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to
an issue of public or general interest may be held liable in damages even if it took every
reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions." 418 U.S. at 346. Such statement appears to indicate Justice Powell's belief in the importance of a basic fault requirement
in all defamation cases involving private figure plaintiffs - even those cases not involving
matters of public concern. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 236 (reading Gertz as imposing on
all private figure plaintiffs a requirement of proving fault).
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deal with the basic fault requirement, 20 5 the Court did not directly address
any issue in that regard. Those who must decide how to apply the decision,
therefore, should not lightly assume that the plurality intended its remarks
to be decisive of any issue other than the issue actually presented by the
case. Because eradication of all fault requirements in private figure-private
concern cases would be such a drastic alteration of existing defamation
rules20° and such a significant retreat in first amendment terms, we should
not believe the Supreme Court has done that, unless the Court directly tells
us so. It has not told us so in Dun & Bradstreet,20 7 which, narrowly read,
should be confined to the presumed and punitive damages issue actually
20 8
raised.
A "worse case" scenario would have the Court not only eradicating all
fault requirements in private figure-private concern cases, but also taking a
giant leap of illogic and ruling that the actual malice requirement imposed
on public officials and public figures (as part of their burden of proof on the
liability issue) 20 9 does not apply to cases involving statements of only private concern, as opposed to statements of public concern. 21 0 It is difficult to
see how statements about public figures could very often be considered to
be of only private concern, and it is exceedingly so with regard to statements about public officials. 211 Nevertheless, a Court bent on requiring the
kinds of content determinations called for by the Dun & Bradstreet plurality could be able to conjure up rules along those lines.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52 and supra note 51.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35 and supra note 196.
207. Neither has the Court told us so in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S.
Ct. 1558 (1986). After discussing Dun & Bradstreet's holding that actual malice need not be
proved in order for a private figure plaintiff to recover presumed or punitive damages in a case
involving only a private concern, Justice O'Connor noted that in a private figure-private concern case, the first amendment "doles] not necessarily force any change in at least some of the
features of the common-law landscape." Id. at 1565. Although such statement falls well short
of stating clearly that Dun & Bradstreet left intact, for all private figure cases, the basic fault
requirement of Gertz, the Court's language can be read as implying (or at least not ruling out)
the notion that even in a private figure-private concern case, the plaintiff must prove some
fault in order to prevail.
208. Dun & Bradstreet was read in that fashion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Connecticut, Inc. v. Glove Newspaper
Co., 395 Mass. 471, 480 N.E.2d 1005 (1985). Reasoning that Dun & Bradstreet established
only that a private figure plaintiff in a private concern case need not prove actual malice in
order to recover presumed or punitive damages, the court concluded that the basic "fault requirement of Gertz [is] intact regardless [ofn whether the private parties are suing on matters
of public or private concern." 395 Mass. at 477 n.4, 480 N.E.2d at 1009 n.4. See also Dunlap
v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d 529, 540, 541, 716 P.2d 842, 850 (1986) (continuing to require a
private figure plaintiff in a private concern case to prove negligence as a necessary element of
his case); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 853 (Va. 1985) (same).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 16-24.
210. See Wiley & Frank, supra note 46, at 32, 33.
211. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
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The scenario just described would involve such an extreme stretching
of Dun & Bradstreet that the changes of its becoming reality should not be
great. Nevertheless, if one takes literally some langauge contained in the
Court's first post-Dun & Bradstreet decision, Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps,"2 one could conclude that the Court is laying the groundwork for a rule requiring the making of public concern-private concern distinctions in cases involving public officials or public figures as plaintiffs. After discussing its prior decisions regarding the constitutional aspects of
defamation, the Court observed, in Hepps, that "[wihen the speech is of
public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier
before recovering damages from a media defendant than is raised by the
13
common law."11
Although the actual malice rules for public officials and public figures
were developed out of concern for preserving and promoting the first
amendment interest of lively debate on public issues, 21 4 the Court has never
gone so far as to state clearly that the actual malice rules imposed on public
official and public figure plaintiffs do not apply if the offending statements
somehow can be shown to be of only private concern. The Court still has
not gone that far, even with the gratuitous language in Hepps about public
officials, public figures, and public concerns. Nevertheless, such language is
unsettling, because if the Court is envisioning a public concern-private concern distinction as part of the public official and public figure rules, it would
be embarking on an uncharted course characterized not only by uncertainty, but also by a virtual guarantee that first amendment rights will be
chilled. 215 It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Court is not inclined to go
the way hinted at in Hepps and superimpose its public concern preoccupa212. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
213. Id. at 1563. The quoted statement's mention of "a media defendant" is another
example of Justice O'Connor's apparent wish to solidify (or at least preserve the possibility of)
some sort of media-nonmedia distinction in defamation actions. See supra note 64.
214. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
215. The difficulties associated with making a public concern-private concern distinction
in a private figure case, see supra text accompanying notes 131-38, would be present to an
even greater degree if lower courts were expected to decide, meaningfully, whether a statement
was of merely private concern even though it involved a public official or figure-a person
about whom the citizenry had a keen interest or concern. In such a situation, inconsistent
results would be likely, as would a tendency, on the part of potential speakers, to refrain from
speaking freely about public officials or public figures. They would so refrain out of fear that a
false statement made innocently about such a party could lead to disastrous financial consequences for the speaker, if the court hearing the public official's or public figure's defamation
action decided that the offending statement dealt only with a matter of private concern and
therefore did not justify application of the actual malice rule. The solution to such constitutional dilemma, of course, is to apply the actual malice rules to all cases involving public figure
plaintiffs (as is done now), without requiring courts to make the sticky public concern-private
concern determination.
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tion on what presently is a workable, understandable set of rules for public
officials and public figures.
CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW PUBLIC CONCERN
APPROACH

The public concern approach taken in Dun & Bradstreet and perpetuated in Hepps is so ill-conceived and poorly-defined that defamation law
would be better served without it, at least so long as it remains in its present nebulous state. The court should seriously consider a wholesale abandonment of the Dun & Bradstreet plurality's restrictions on Gertz's applicability and should reinstate, as the governing standards for all private figure
plaintiff cases, the constitutional rules set forth in Gertz2 1 6 without requiring the troublesome public concern-private concern determination. Although there is nothing magical or perfect about Gertz ( or Gertz as it was
thought to be before Dun & Bradstreet"), the old Gertz pastures appear
decidedly greener now that the Court has led defamation law to the edge of
the Dun & Bradstreet swamp.

It is probably more realistic to assume that Dun & Bradstreet's public
concern approach will remain viable than to assume that it will be discarded.21 6 If the public concern doctrine called for by the plurality is to be
applied by lower courts in any reasonable and consistent fashion, the Supreme Court must, in future cases, define the contours of the public concern
concept and must enunciate clear standards for determining when a public
concern is present. Similarly, the Court should attempt to set forth guidelines to aid judges, attorneys, and parties in working their way through the
semantic maze of public controversies, public concerns, and public interests. 219 Finally, the Court must clarify, at its earliest opportunity, that Dun
& Bradstreet affects only Gertz's presumed and punitive damages rule,
without affecting Gertz's basic fault requirement and the fault requirement
imposed on public officials and public figures. If the Supreme Court does
not provide direction of the sort mentioned here, the constitutional law of
defamation will be headed back toward Justice Black's defamation quagmire - assuming it is not already there.

216. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
217. See supra note 87 and supra text accompanying note 87-99.
218. Indeed, the Hepps decision indicates the Court's adherence to the doctrine. 106 S.
Ct. at 1559, 1563.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 142-50.
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